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Abstract
In view of the deferred start of negotiations for the modernization of the customs union between
the EU and Turkey (CU-EUT), we looked back and analysed the ex post trade consequences of
the CU-EUT. Employing up-to-date econometric best practices for regional integration agree-
ments, we quantified both the total and the heterogeneous trade effects of the CU-EUT. In contrast
with most previous studies, our results indicate that the CU-EUT made a significantly positive,
large and robust impact, implying there was an additional increase in EU-Turkey trade in
manufacturing by 55–65 per cent compared with that during the previously active Ankara Agree-
ment. We also provide evidence that the CU-EUT significantly increased Turkey’s trade with non-
member countries of the CU-EUT. Additionally, a substantial heterogeneity in the CU-EUT effect
was found across different industries as well as for each of its member countries and the direction
of trade. We linked the heterogeneity of up to 911 coefficient estimates to the differences in initial
trade costs and show that it cannot be ascribed to reductions in bilateral tariff rates.
Keywords: gravity model; European integration; country-specific effects
Introduction
In May 2015 the Turkish government and the European Commission officially started a
process for the modernization and expansion of the customs union (CU) between the
EU and Turkey (hereafter called CU-EUT) that had entered into force almost 20years
previously on 31 December 1995. In December 2016 the European Commission asked
the European Council for a mandate to launch negotiations. However, in August 2017
the German government publicly opposed this decision and announced the suspension
of any preparatory work for the reform of the CU-EUT over concerns about democratic
development and the human rights situation in Turkey (Höhler, 2017; Tastan, 2017).
Consultations in the European Council about opening negotiations are still in process (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2020).1 Amidst recent political tensions between the EU and Turkey,
an effort to look back and assess the economic consequences that the CU-EUT has hith-
erto brought about for both parties seemed worthwhile and well timed. We wanted to con-
tribute to this debate by taking up the following main research question: how successful
has the CU-EUT been in spurring on trade flows between Turkey and the EU?
We are not the first to tackle this question. In preparation for the opening of negotiation
talks the European Commission asked for two external studies by the World Bank (2014)
and by BKP, Panteia and AESA (2016). In their empirical ex post evaluations these
studies reached sobering conclusions about the effect of the CU-EUT on bilateral trade
1http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/
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flows in a gravity modelling framework. While the World Bank (2014, pp. 93–96) found
no statistically significant effect, BKP, Panteia and AESA (2016, pp. 66–67) found an
overall negative impact of the CU-EUT on two-way goods trade.
In addition to these two large-scale studies, other academic works in the literature
on gravity modelling are inconclusive about the trade effects of the CU-EUT.
Table A1 in the Appendix (together with a discussion in Section A) summarizes the
underlying data, empirical methods and results of the World Bank (2014) and BKP,
Panteia and AESA (2016), as well as seven other gravity studies. While Antonucci
and Manzocchi (2006), Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2007), Magee (2016), Mumcu Akan
and Engin Balin (2016) as well as Frede and Yetkiner (2017) found no evidence for
a significant and relevant trade-enhancing effect of the CU-EUT, Neyaptı
et al. (2007) and Adam and Moutos (2008) estimated there was a significantly positive
and economically large impact. These inconclusive findings in the literature motivated
our second research question: which methodological differences can explain the con-
siderable divergence of results across these studies? This and all following additional
research questions aimed to help provide a better and more detailed understanding
of the overall effect considered in the main research question.
Turkey’s process of continuous economic integration into the EU dates back to
1963, when both parties signed the Association Agreement, known as the Ankara
Agreement, in which they agreed to establish a customs union. The Additional Proto-
col was signed in 1970, setting out the timetable for the progressive abolition of bilat-
eral customs duties over a period of 22years. The protocol required both parties to
remove all bilateral tariffs and quantitative restrictions on all industrial goods and
the industrial components of processed agricultural products. The implementation of
the CU-EUT committed Turkey to align itself to the EU’s customs tariffs and rules
and to its commercial policy vis-à-vis third countries, as well as to the EU’s acquis
in the areas covered by the CU-EUT. As the World Bank (2014, p. 19) confirms,
the CU-EUT has harmonized and decreased Turkey’s import tariffs by applying the
EU’s common external tariff for most industrial products. Moreover, the approximation
of laws resulted in improvements in Turkey’s internal technical legislation and pro-
vided an important impetus to customs reforms and trade facilitation in Turkey (World
Bank, 2014, pp. 32, 46).
One heavily debated feature of the CU-EUT that is uncommon for a customs union
is its asymmetric decision-making structure. Under the CU-EUT harmonization is
unilaterally determined by the EU, meaning that Turkey must align itself with the
EU rules as they are, without being able to participate in the EU’s decision-making
mechanisms. Turkey is required to recognize all trade policies taken by the EU vis-
à-vis third countries, such as free trade agreements (FTAs), tariff reductions or prefer-
ential market access. At the same time, as Turkey is not a member of the EU it does
not receive automatic reciprocal access to these markets and it is not permitted to par-
ticipate in the negotiations on trade liberalizations with outsiders. Consequently,
Turkey has yielded part of its trade-policy sovereignty to the EU. If this feature of
the CU-EUT has asymmetric effects on Turkish imports and exports, Turkish con-
sumers may benefit from cheaper imports from third countries, while Turkish pro-
ducers may be confronted with higher competition without receiving easier access to
non-EU markets than in the absence of the CU-EUT (Yalcin et al., 2016, pp. 12,
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16). These considerations on the CU-EUT’s third-country effects led to our next re-
search question: did the CU-EUT directly affect imports and exports between Turkey
and non-EU member countries?2
While up to this point we have focused on the differential effects on Turkish trade
with EU members and non-members, policymakers are often particularly interested in
heterogenous effects across countries and sectors. Although economic theory suggests
that, generally, countries gain from trade liberalization, recently many political debates
on regional trade agreements (RTAs) have raised concerns about one-way trade deals
and challenged the view that RTAs bring prosperity to individual nations. Therefore,
we asked the following final research question: are there heterogeneous directional im-
pacts of the CU-EUT observed for each pair of member countries within the customs
union, both for aggregate and sectoral trade flows, and do these differences follow sys-
tematic patterns?
Our analysis yields the following answers to the outlined research questions: when
taking into account the latest developments in structural gravity estimation; namely
non-linear estimates with exporter-time, importer-time and country-pair fixed effects
with both international and intranational trade flows and controlling for a general glob-
alization trend – we found there is a strong, highly significant and positive effect of
the CU-EUT on trade between Turkey and the EU.3 Deviations from these best prac-
tices can help explain the diverse results in the literature. Based on recent contributions
in the literature on structural gravity, we are the first to demonstrate that the CU-EUT
also significantly fostered Turkish trade with non-EU member countries. We found
some support for the concerns about asymmetric third-country effects: while Turkish
exports experience an economically and statistically significant increase, imports to
Turkey are indeed more strongly affected. Estimating country-specific and
sector-specific effects reveals substantial heterogeneity in both dimensions, which can
partly be explained by pre-liberalization openness.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section I describes the structural gravity
framework and its estimation challenges. In Section II we briefly introduce the data-set.
Section III then displays and discusses our results. Finally, Section IV adds concluding
remarks. A more detailed discussion of the literature, data description and additional
results can be found in the Appendix.
I. Estimation Strategy
Over the past four decades, the structural gravity equation has become the workhorse em-
pirical model for studying the determinants of bilateral trade flows and the ex post effects
of trade policies in particular. The gravity equation owes its prominence in the empirical
literature on trade both to its remarkable predictive power and to its theoretical
2Neyaptı et al. (2007) also report some results for the trade effects with EU and non-EU countries. However, their identi-
fication of the non-EU country effect rests upon the complete omission of time controls, contradicting, for example, the au-
thors’ arguments on global trade trends, financial crises and the effects of the earthquake of 1999.
3Under the CU-EUT, deep trade liberalization is secured only in the industrial goods sector, which is subject to great leg-
islative alignment, but its coverage of other policy areas – mainly primary agriculture, services and public procurement – is
incomplete. In our analysis we therefore focused on the effects of the CU-EUT on manufacturing trade flows.
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microeconomic foundations. We follow representation Anderson and vanWincoop (2003)
who derive a gravity equation in a setting with nationally differentiated goods:
X ij;t ¼ Y i;tEj;tY t
tij;t
Πi;tPj;t
 1σ
; (1)
Π1σi;t ¼ ∑j
tij;t
Pj;t
 1σEj;t
Y t
; (2)
P1σj;t ¼ ∑i
tij;t
Πi;t
 1σY i;t
Y t
; (3)
where Xij,t denotes international (i ≠ j) and intranational (i = j) nominal trade flows from
exporter i to destination j, Ej,t is the total expenditure in j and Yi,t the value of total produc-
tion in i, Yt denotes the value of world output, tij,t are bilateral trade friction between i and
j (all for a specific year t), and σ> 1 indicates the elasticity of substitution among goods
from different countries.
The right-hand side of equation 1 is the product of two ratios: first, the size term that is
interpretable as the predicted frictionless trade flow as if there were no trade costs and sec-
ond, the trade cost term, which is the ratio of predicted to hypothetical frictionless trade.
In an analogy with Newtonian gravity, equation 1 predicts that international trade (grav-
itational force) between two countries (objects) increases with the product of their sizes
(masses) and decreases with the trade costs (the square of distance) between them (Ander-
son, 2011, p. 144; Yotov et al., 2016, pp. 5, 16).
Importantly, the trade cost term in Equation 1 also depends on the two structural terms
Πi and Pj that were called multilateral resistance terms (MRTs) by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003). The MRTs formalize the intuitive argument that two countries will trade
more with each other the more remote they are from all other countries. By capturing the
general remoteness of the exporters and importers, these terms imply that bilateral trade
flows depend on relative trade costs.
Yotov et al. (2016) compile best-practice solutions to translate the gravity system
given by equations (1)–(3) into the following empirical specification that we used to es-
timate the CU-EUT trade effects:
X ij;t ¼ exp πi;t þ χj;t þ μij þ zij;t’β þ γCU EUTij;t
 
þ εij;t (4)
εij,t denotes a remainder error term. The terms πi,t and χj,t are time-varying exporter and
importer fixed effects that control for the MRTs Πi and Pj which are not directly observ-
able. In addition to capturing the MRTs, the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects
absorb Yi,t and Ej,t and further control for any other observable and unobservable
exporter-specific and importer-specific factors that may influence trade flows and are
not specifically related to bilateral trade friction, such as national policies or productivity
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shocks.4 Furthermore, our specifications include asymmetric country-pair fixed effects μij
to tackle potential endogeneity concerns due to unobserved heterogeneity or selection into
trade policies.5 To allow trade flows to be adjusted and errors to be correlated, we esti-
mated equation 4 using three-year intervals and report multiway clustered standard errors
by exporter, importer and year.
zij,t (with corresponding parameter vector β) collects time-varying bilateral trade cost
factors, such as an indicator variable RTAij,t that equals 1 if i and j at time t belong to
an RTA, including the CU-EUT, and zero otherwise. It also contains an international bor-
der dummy (equal to one for international trade and zero otherwise) interacted with period
dummies that hence flexibly control for changes of international trade costs relative to
intranational trade costs over time.
Further, the main variable of interest is the indicator variable CUEUTij;t which be-
comes 1 for all trade flows between Turkey and EU members, starting with the introduc-
tion of the CU-EUT in 1996. γ hence captures the trade liberalization between the EU and
Turkey of the CU-EUT.
Besides estimating the overall impact of the CU-EUT, we identified the heterogeneous
effects of the CU-EUT by (1) including separate indicators for Turkish exports and im-
ports to and from the EU after 1996 (‘CU-EUT: EU → TUR’ and ‘CU-EUT: TUR →
EU’), (2) adding indicators for Turkish trade flows with non-EU countries after the intro-
duction of the CU-EUT (‘CU-EUT: TUR ↔ Non-EU’ or ‘CU-EUT: Non-EU → TUR’
and ‘CU-EUT: TUR → Non-EU’), (3) allowing the CU-EUT effect to differ for every
EU partner and (4) considering the general CU-EUT effect as well as the aforementioned
heterogeneous effects at a more disaggregated industry level.
This breakdown of effects according to trade directions, partners and sectors follows
recent contributions in the general RTA literature by Baier et al. (2019) and Zylkin (2016).
In estimating the third-country effects, we drew upon recent advances in the gravity liter-
ature that make use of intranational trade flows to identify the effects of unilateral,
non-discriminatory policies. Heid et al. (2017) and Beverelli et al. (2018) demonstrate
that the multicollinearity of variables capturing such policies with the importer-time and
exporter-time fixed effects can be overcome by interacting the policy variable with an in-
ternational border dummy. Similarly, in our setting, the ‘CU-EUT’ and the ‘TUR↔Non-
EU’ variables would be jointly collinear with the set of fixed effects if we included only
international trade flows in our analysis. By adding internal trade and introducing the
same international border dummy interaction as Heid et al. (2017), we were able to iden-
tify both the direct and the third-country effect of the CU-EUT. Our application of this
method is similar in spirit to that of Larch et al. (2018) who also investigate the unilateral
effect of a multilateral variable; in their case, the effect of joining the eurozone on trade
flows between the new members and non-eurozone member countries.
4Therefore, the fixed effects also control for macroeconomic disturbances that occurred in the period after the the CU-EUT
entry into force, mainly Turkey’s balance of payments crisis in 2001 and the 2007–08 global financial crisis, and were men-
tioned by the World Bank (2014, p. 94) and BKP, Panteia and AESA (2016, p. 27) as a concern for the identification of the
CU-EUT effects in their gravity estimates.
5Note that our extensive sets of fixed effects also capture several dimensions of another important determinant of trade
flows; namely, the existence of migrant populations. Specifically, the country-pair fixed effects control for time-invariant
level differences, while country-time varying fixed effects capture general exporter-time or importer-time specific migration
trends.
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Most previous studies on CU-EUT effects estimate a log-linearized version of the
gravity equation using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate. As Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) point out, this leads to inconsistent estimates in the presence of
heteroscedasticity or systematic zero trade flows. We followed their suggestion and esti-
mated the gravity model in its original multiplicative form with the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. In order to overcome computational
challenges associated with the PPML estimator with three types of high-dimensional
fixed effects that until recently prevented the estimation of this specification, we used
Tom Zylkin’s ppml_panel_sg- command, introduced by Larch et al. (2019).
II. Data
The data-set used was kindly provided by Thomas Zylkin and is an industry-level version
of the data-set employed by Baier et al. (2019). The database is a balanced panel that
covers bilateral trade in the manufacturing sector for a sample of 69 countries over the pe-
riod 1988–2006.6 Importantly, it contains both international and intranational trade data.
The intranational trade data are consistently constructed as the difference between gross
production and total exports, that were originally obtained from UN COMTRADE, the
Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales TradeProd database, the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization IndStat and the World Bank Trade,
Production and Protection database.
Note that most commonly used standard trade data-sets cannot be utilized for our anal-
ysis as they do not provide intranational trade data. Our high requirements on the data in
terms of sectoral, country and intranational coverage left us with a data-set that did not
contain the period 2007–19. However, the introduction of the CU-EUT falls well into
our available data period, leaving us with enough variation to estimate the effect of
interest.
RTA data were taken from Mario Larch’s RTA database from Egger and
Larch (2008). In addition, standard gravity covariates (distance, contiguity, common
language, World Trade Organization [WTO] membership and colonial ties) were taken
from the Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales GeoDist
database.
Finally, we retrieved bilateral tariff data for the EU and Turkey from the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development’s trade analysis information system data-
base. Specifically, we used data on effectively applied tariffs at the two-digit and
three-digit manufacturing industry level from the World Integrated Trade Solution
(wits.worldbank.org). Summary statistics are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
III. Results of Calculations
Main Results
Table 1 reports the main results for the estimates in model 4 with aggregate trade data.
The coefficient of the CU-EUT in Column 1 is highly significant and indicates a large
6A list of included countries is provided in Section B of the Appendix.
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economic effect: the CU-EUT increased bilateral trade between the EU and Turkey by
(e0.472  1) × 100 per cent=60 per cent. The effect of the CU-EUT is additional to the
average trade effect of the RTAs included in the data-set (which also covers the Ankara
Agreement). These initial results demonstrate that the CU-EUT was much more success-
ful in promoting trade than other RTAs, which on average increased bilateral trade by 28
per cent. Overall Turkish-European liberalization efforts hence increased bilateral trade
flows by (e0.472 + 0.243  1)×100 per cent=104 per cent.
Roy (2010) and Baier et al. (2018) find that a customs union and other types of deep
agreements (such as common markets or economic unions) have larger average effects
than FTAs.7 Motivated by these findings, in Column 2 of Table 1 the RTA dummy is split
in CUs and other RTAs (FTAs, economic integration agreements and partial scope agree-
ments), as well as a separate EU dummy. The results suggest that these deep agreements
promote trade more strongly.
Column 3 of Table 1 shows the possible asymmetry of trade effects of the CU-EUT in
the direction of trade, that is, for EU versus Turkish exports. The results indicate that
while the CU-EUT has increased EU exports to Turkey by 49 per cent, Turkish exports
to the EU have risen by 74 per cent. These results contradict the findings of Neyaptı
et al. (2007), Adam and Moutos (2008) and Frede and Yetkiner (2017), who find larger
benefits from the CU-EUT for EU exports than for Turkish exports.
The CU-EUT required Turkey to align itself with the EU’s common external tariff,
which led to a reduction of Turkey’s import tariffs for third countries and thereby
reduced the EU’s preferential access to the Turkish market. Moreover, some provisions
of the CU-EUT, for example, Turkey’s adoption of the EU acquis and the improvement
of customs procedures in Turkey, may have a unilateral liberalization component and may
have stimulated Turkey’s trade with the rest of the world. Our international and
intranational trade data allowed us to implement a specification that quantifies this unilat-
eral component while still rigorously sticking to the theoretical constraints of structural
gravity. Specifically, we did so by adding in Column 4 a dummy variable that is equal
to one for Turkey’s international trade flows with all non-EU countries after 1996, and
zero otherwise (that is, for trade between other partners as well as for all observations be-
fore 1996), seeking to control for Turkey’s overall liberalization vis-à-vis third countries
as a consequence of the CU-EUT. The indicator for Turkey’s outside trade is highly sig-
nificant and suggests that the reductions in bilateral trade frictions between Turkey and
non-EU countries after the entry into force of the CU-EUT have increased trade flows
by 28 per cent. This finding provides evidence that the CU-EUT is rightly ‘generally
credited with Turkey’s openness to the world’ (BKP, Panteia and AESA, 2016, p. 11).
Column 5 further shows whether the effects of the CU-EUT on Turkey’s bilateral mar-
ket access with the rest of the world are asymmetric in the direction of trade. A larger in-
crease is found for Turkish imports from non-EU countries than for its exports, which
may be explained by the required lowering of Turkey’s import tariffs. Although the hy-
pothesis of asymmetric third-country effects is confirmed by our estimates, the results also
show benefits for Turkish exporters gaining market access in non-EU countries as a con-
sequence of the CU-EUT. In an additional robustness test reported in the Appendix, we
7Deep agreements go beyond mere tariff reductions and additionally contain agreements concerning, for example, public
procurement, technical barriers to trade or intellectual property rights.
Mario Larch, Aiko F. Schmeißer and Joschka Wanner8
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons
Ltd
found evidence that Turkey faces a higher competitive pressure from EU-RTA partners
who gain preferential access to the Turkish market without reciprocity.8
Column 6 also shows how the asymmetric effects of the CU-EUT on member trade
flows are changed by the inclusion of the dummy for Turkey’s trade with non-EU coun-
tries after 1996. The estimate of EU exports to Turkey increases considerably when taking
into account the preference erosion faced by EU exporters in the Turkish market. Overall,
the asymmetry in the CU-EUT effects shrinks and now indicates that Turkish exports
benefited only a little more than EU exports. A Wald test on the equality of both coeffi-
cients gives a P value of 0.64 and does not thereby provide any evidence that the CU-
EUT’s trade effects are significantly different for EU exports to Turkey versus Turkish ex-
ports to the EU.9 The World Bank (2014, p. 94) and BKP, Panteia and AESA (2016, p.
28) were concerned that China’s accession to the WTO and general tariff reductions
due to WTO agreements reduced relative preferences in the EU-Turkey trade relation.
Therefore, we additionally included a WTO dummy in Column 6, which is positive
and highly statistically significant.
We investigated the robustness of the large and positive CU-EUT effects by addition-
ally considering specifications with consecutive years, three-year lags and leads of the
policy variables, as well as bilateral time trends. The robustness experiments strongly
confirm the significant bilateral CU-EUT effect and the CU-EUT’s additional non-EU lib-
eralization impact.10
Overall, our estimates provide strong evidence that the CU-EUT increased trade flows
between their members significantly more than an average RTA. In the following, we of-
fer potential reasons for the relatively strong impact of the CU-EUT. As mentioned be-
fore, as a result of the Additional Protocol in 1970 bilateral tariffs in EU-Turkey trade
had been widely removed before the entry into force of the CU-EUT. Therefore, tariff
reductions are unlikely to explain the large effect of the CU-EUT. The strong impact
of the CU-EUT may be explained by the structural advantage of a customs union com-
pared with an FTA, which lies in the removal of the requirement for certificates of origin.
Extensive checks to ascertain the origin of goods can cause substantial monitoring and
compliance costs for firms in FTA member countries and thereby impair intertwined pro-
duction networks. As members of a customs union apply the same external tariff to third
countries, there is no need for such certificates. Using a partial equilibrium model, the
World Bank (2014, pp. 22–24) estimated that if the CU-EUT was replaced by an
EU-Turkey FTA, certificates of origin would decrease EU exports to Turkey by 2.0 to
4.2 per cent and Turkish exports to the EU by 3.0 to 7.2 per cent.11 In addition, the
8Specifically, Table A3 adds to specifications 4 to 6 of Table 1 the variable ‘CU-EUT: EU-RTA partners→ TUR’, captur-
ing differential trade effects of imports from EU-RTA partners to Turkey after the entry into force of the respective RTA
from 1996 onwards. While the results for this effect are highly statistically significant, the other CU-EUT effects remain
very robust.
9The specification with asymmetric CU-EUT effects of Column 6 cannot be estimated with two asymmetric dummies for
Turkey’s trade with non-EU countries after 1996 which were included in Column 5. Even with intranational trade data,
these four indicators would be perfectly collinear with the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects.
10Detailed results are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. The only specifications where there is no significant unilateral
effect are those including bilateral time trends, leaving very little variation for identifying unilateral effects.
11The current CU-EUT, however, was unable to eliminate origin requirements completely. To claim preferences in
EU-Turkey trade, firms are still required to present ATR movement certificates (HM Revenue and Customs, 2018). While
the CU-EUT clearly simplifies border controls compared with a FTA, these certificates indicate that trade costs from doc-
umentation remain.
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CU-EUT – in combination with Turkey’s EU accession process – has led to an extensive
legislative harmonization that is not comparable to many other RTAs. Regulatory ap-
proximations constitute an important part of removing trade barriers in the EU single
market. Turkey’s far-reaching alignment with the EU acquis covers a wide range of pol-
icy areas, including standards in quality infrastructure, customs administration, intellec-
tual property rights and competition policy (BKP, Panteia and AESA, 2016, p. 22),
and is likely to play a key role in the promotion of large trade flows. Our empirical ap-
proach, however, cannot disentangle these different channels of influence for the esti-
mated trade effects of the CU-EUT.
Explaining Differences between This and Previous Studies
Our estimates indicate that the CU-EUT trade effects are considerably higher than sug-
gested by many previous gravity studies on the CU-EUT.12 In order to analyse to what ex-
tent the recent methodological innovations of the gravity literature incorporated in our
specifications can explain the differing findings, Table 2 depicts the results for various
changes in the model specification. Column 1 replicates our preferred specification from
Column 4 in Table 1. Column 2 reproduces Column 1 of Table 1, following all best prac-
tices but without controlling for the unilateral liberalization component. Altering the con-
trol group in this way slightly reduces the magnitude of the CU-EUT effect. Column 3
follows all previous studies on the trade effect of the CU-EUT by not considering
intranational trade flows. Due to the exclusion of observations for intranational trade,
the coefficient of the CU-EUT shrinks and is now interpreted as a partial effect of the
CU-EUT of 39 per cent. This indicates that the CU-EUT enhanced bilateral trade at the
expense of domestic sales among its member countries (Yotov et al., 2016, p. 50). Mattoo
et al. (2017), p. 26) provide another reason for the diverging estimates with and without
internal flows: if deep agreements also promote trade with third countries, the unilateral
effect of deep agreements is absorbed by the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects
when including only international trade. As the CU-EUT is generally credited with Tur-
key’s commitment to an open trading regime and its unilateral liberalization to the rest
of the world, the inclusion of intranational trade data is crucial for the identification of
the overall impact of the CU-EUT on bilateral trade flows. No previous CU-EUT gravity
study includes intranational trade, which is an important explanation for the fact that their
estimates are typically lower than ours.
Columns 4 to 6 in turn each add one other deviation from the best practice specifica-
tion. Specifically, Column 4 reports results from the specification of Column 3 based
on Turkish trade flows only (see Magee, 2016, for such an application). With this restric-
tion no exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects can be estimated and hence MRTs
are not properly controlled for. Column 5 estimates the specification from Column 3 in
log-linearized form with OLS (see Adam and Moutos [2008] for such a model). The
omission of the zero trade flows from the reference group as well as heteroskedasticity
are two aspects that may bias estimates of the effects of the CU-EUT. Column 6 repeats
the specification from Column 3, not including any country-related fixed effects but
12Section A and Table A1 in the Appendix thoroughly review the findings and underlying empirical methods of all previous
studies that we refer to in the main text and explicitly point out their methodological differences compared with our main
specification, as well as differences in data coverage, both concerning the country sample and the covered time period.
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adding standard gravity covariates instead. In line with the RTA results of Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) and Yotov et al. (2016), pp. 51–52), the estimated CU-EUT effect
may be underestimated without properly taking into account the endogeneity of the trade
policy variable. Indeed, in the first two cases the estimated CU-EUT effect is lowered a
little further. In the specification without any fixed effects (Column 6), the CU-EUT
completely loses its significance and is estimated to be close to zero.
Column 7 follows Antonucci and Manzocchi (2006), Neyaptı et al. (2007),
Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2007) and Mumcu Akan and Engin Balin (2016) by estimating
a model using only a sample for Turkey’s bilateral trade with all other countries in the
log-linearized version using OLS (by combining the shortcomings from columns 4 and
5. In line with most of these studies, we found no economically or statistically significant
effect of the CU-EUT in this case.
In Column 8 we combined the shortcomings of columns 4 and 6 and estimated a
specification with Turkish trade flows that does not control for unobserved bilateral
heterogeneity. This specification resembles the one used in BKP, Panteia and
AESA (2016). This specification also turns out to be clearly downward biased with
an insignificant estimated coefficient of 0.125. The direction of the bias provides a
(partial) rational for the finding of BKP, Panteia and AESA (2016) who estimate an
even significantly negative effect of 0.14. A plausible explanation for the remaining
discrepancy is that BKP, Panteia and AESA (2016) use a sample from 1990 to
2015 (that is, also capturing the Turkish balance of payments crisis as well as the
global trade collapse during the financial crisis starting in 2008) without controlling
for time effects. In their consideration of the pre-crisis period from 1990 to 2000 they
find a positive significant effect of 0.33.
Column 9 combines the shortcomings of columns 5 and 6 and estimates a
log-linearized model without fixed effects. This is comparable to the specification of
World Bank (2014).13 Our estimated coefficient is reduced to 0.16 and turns insignificant.
World Bank (2014) find a similar insignificant coefficient of 0.2.
Finally, Column 10 combines all deviations from the best practices considered before;
that is, it reports the results of estimating a log-linearized gravity equation of Turkish in-
ternational trade flows only without any country-related fixed effects, similar to the spec-
ification by Frede and Yetkiner (2017). In this specification we again do not find a
significant impact of CU-EUT on its members’ trade flows.
Heterogeneous Effects across Sectors and Members
Up to this point, we have evaluated the trade effects of the CU-EUT for aggregate
manufacturing trade flows. However, the implied trade cost changes may have quite het-
erogeneous effects across different sectors. Table 3 shows the results for the CU-EUT ef-
fects across eight different manufacturing industries, each analysed in a separate
regression. It reveals that the CU-EUT has very different impacts across industries. The
largest effects of the CU-EUT are found for trade in machinery and wood, whereas the
smallest coefficients are estimated for minerals, chemicals and food. In all sectors except
13Note that strictly speaking, the World Bank (2014) estimates a Heckman model following Helpman et al. (2008). This,
however, also features a log-linearized intensive margin component that faces the same heteroscedasticity bias as a simple
OLS estimation (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2015).
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metals the CU-EUT has significantly promoted trade flows. The elimination of the need
for certificates of origin in the CU-EUT is likely to explain the large impact in the machin-
ery sector, because industries that feature deep integration with multiple border crossings
along the value chain tend to benefit disproportionately from this trade cost reduction. The
relatively weak performance in the food and metals sectors is not surprising, as the
CU-EUT has liberalized trade in these sectors to a very limited extent. The ‘Decision
of the EU-Turkey Association Council No 1/98’ of 1998 and the ‘Agreement between
the European Coal and Steel Community and Turkey of 1996’ were signed as two addi-
tional FTAs in order to provide preferential access for many agricultural and fisheries as
well as all coal and steel products that were excluded from the CU-EUT. Trade cost re-
ductions from these two FTAs are also captured by our bilateral CU-EUT dummy. How-
ever, under the first-mentioned FTA Turkey continued to protect its agricultural sector by
granting very few preferential tariffs (BKP, Panteia and AESA, 2016, pp. 20–21). As
shown in Figure 1, Turkey actually increased its tariffs on food imports from the EU after
the entry into force of the CU-EUT.
Moreover, both FTAs require different certificates of origin from those that are neces-
sary for products covered by the CU-EUT (HM Revenue and Customs, 2018). The rela-
tively small effects in the minerals and chemicals sector might be explained by the
remaining technical barriers to trade resulting from the complex EU regulations that im-
ply high compliance costs for Turkish firms, as well as by the lack of Turkey’s participa-
tion in the EU’s decision-making bodies that shape the technical regulations in these
sectors (World Bank, 2014, pp. 36, 105). For pharmaceuticals, for example, trade frictions
remain due to the lack of recognition of good manufacturing practices and marketing au-
thorization requirements of both parties (BKP, Panteia and AESA, 2016, pp. 54–55).14
Table 3 additionally shows significant liberalization effects with third countries in almost
Figure 1: Tariff Changes and Heterogeneous Effects in the Customs Union between the EU and
Turkey (CU-EUT) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
14There are other factors that might explain the revealed sector heterogeneity. Baier et al. (2019) have considered, including
the role of revealed market power, the range of traded products ex ante and factor endowment differences. However, their
analysis seeks to detect determinants of RTA effect heterogeneity across member states (i.e. why RTAs reduce trade costs
more strongly for some countries than for others), not across sectors. Due to the limited number of sectors we considered in
our study, an empirical investigation of potential explaining factors for the heterogeneous CU-EUT sector effects was not
feasible.
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all sectors, except for an insignificant increase in metals and a significant negative effect
in food. The World Bank (2014, p. 19) demonstrates that after the formation of the
CU-EUT Turkey increased its applied most-favoured nation tariffs for many products that
are not covered by the CU-EUT, which might drive the differential third-country effects
in the metals and food sector.
Table A5 in the Appendix analyses the heterogeneity in the effects of the CU-EUT for
each EU member’s exports and imports. For aggregate manufacturing trade flows, we
found that for almost all country pairs the CU-EUT has significantly increased trade flows
(with negatively affected imports from Malta and Cyprus as two notable exceptions).15 At
the same time, the results also demonstrate that much variation is missed when looking
solely at the average CU-EUT effect. The largest effects are found for trade between
Turkey and Ireland, Portugal, Belgium and Finland, while the impact of the CU-EUT is
lowest for Turkey’s trading partners Italy, Austria and Germany. Besides the heterogene-
ity across member pairs, our results indicate that within most pairs the trade effect is larger
for Turkish exports than for the exports of the respective EU partner. Highly asymmetric
impacts are found for Turkish trade with Malta, Cyprus, Ireland, Denmark and the UK, in
each case in favour of Turkish exports. In contrast, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Germany received more or less the same amount of access to the Turkish market that it
offered in return to Turkish exporters.
Columns 1 to 8 of Table A5 combine the two dimensions of heterogeneity, allowing
for different export and import effects in each sector and country pair. Overall the 286 co-
efficients on the two-digit level confirm the robustness of the CU-EUT effect with an av-
erage point estimate of 0.697. Two-thirds of the coefficients are significantly positive (at
the 10 per cent level). At the same time, the standard deviation of 1.022 shows the sub-
stantial heterogeneity across pairs, directions and sectors. A similar pattern emerges when
re-estimating at the three-digit level. The average of the 911 coefficients is 0.766, with
again a share of two-thirds of significantly positive estimates and a somewhat higher var-
iation (standard deviation of 1.346). We next made use of the two-digit coefficients to
highlight graphically potential underlying patterns and determinants of the heterogeneous
CU-EUT trade effects.
Baier et al. (2019) and Zylkin (2016) analyse a variety of possible determinants of het-
erogeneous trade effects within the same RTA. As Zylkin (2016) states, a typical ap-
proach in ex ante studies on the effects of RTAs is to assume that heterogeneous
member effects arise from differences in their ex ante tariff levels. However, in the case
of the North American Free Trade Agreement Zylkin (2016) has shown that the ex post
estimates of heterogeneous trade effects are not correlated with what projections based
on tariffs would have suggested. For the CU-EUT there are two reasons that make it un-
likely that ex ante tariffs explain the estimated heterogeneous member effects. Firstly, as
noted above, due to the large tariff reductions determined by the Additional Protocol few
tariffs remained before the CU-EUT went into force. Secondly, within the EU all member
countries applied the same import tariffs in 1995, while at the same time there is a large
15Note that the estimated effects for Turkey’s trade with Cyprus, Malta, Hungary and Poland should be interpreted with cau-
tion, as these countries joined the EU in 2004, which is why the identification of their dummies rely on a single post-CU-
EUT observation. To maximize comparability between EU member states considered and to reduce outliers, we limit our
sample in our graphical analysis in Figures 1 and 2 to countries that were already EU members at the introduction of the
CU-EUT in 1996.
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variation in the estimated CU-EUT effects for EU imports from Turkey. Figure 1 is a
scatterplot showing the bilateral tariff changes between the introduction of CU-EUT
and the time our sample ends. If tariffs were to explain the heterogeneity in estimated co-
efficients, we would see a negative correlation as stronger tariff reductions should go hand
in hand with higher trade effects. The figure indicates that bilateral sectoral tariff changes
do a poor job of explaining heterogeneous changes in trade friction from the CU-EUT and
contribute to the overall conclusion that the effects of the CU-EUT on bilateral trade go
far beyond the removal of tariffs.
A different source for the observed heterogeneity may be the initial level of sectoral
bilateral trade costs. Similar to Baier et al. (2019), we used the estimated asymmetric pair
fixed effects from the regressions in columns 1 to 8 of Table 3 as an inverse measure for
bilateral trade costs. If the CU-EUT has stronger effects in sectors and for country pairs
that had a high liberalization potential (that is, a low initial openness), we expect a nega-
tive correlation between the estimated coefficients and estimated fixed effects. Figure 2
confirms this hypothesis. It further illustrates the asymmetries between Turkish exports
and imports. Turkish exports tended to face higher initial trade friction and experienced
stronger increases after the introduction of the CU-EUT, while EU exports were on aver-
age more open to begin with and thus increased to a smaller extent.
Baier et al. (2019) developed a two-stage estimation procedure to analyse more for-
mally the effects of multiple determinants of the heterogeneous member effects of RTAs.
We followed their approach and ran regressions of our almost 1001 estimated CU-EUT
coefficients at the two-digit and three-digit level on tariff reductions, bilateral trade costs,
a Turkish export indicator variable and a set of sector dummies. In line with the graphical
evidence, the important drivers of heterogeneity are initial bilateral trade costs and the di-
rection of trade. Additionally, the regressions confirm sectoral heterogeneity. Tariff cuts,
in contrast, do not explain the observed differences in trade effects.16
16For the detailed regression results, see Table A5 in the Appendix for the full sample and Table A6 for the sample includ-
ing only EU member countries from 1996 (as used in Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 2: Bilateral Openness and Heterogeneous Effects in the Customs Union between the EU
and Turkey (CUEUT)
Note: ln(Pair FE) refers to the natural logarithm of the estimated bilateral fixed effects. [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Conclusion
Has the CU-EUT actually increased trade flows between the EU and Turkey?
Many academic studies in the gravity literature as well as the two large-scale studies on
the CU-EUT by the World Bank (2014) and by BKP, Panteia and AESA (2016) do not
find a significantly positive and economically relevant trade effect of the CU-EUT.
We here provide a thorough reassessment of the CU-EUT, estimating both total and
heterogeneous effects using a non-linear structural gravity specification with three-way
fixed effects and intranational trade flows. We found the CU-EUT had a significant,
strongly positive and robust impact. We are also able to quantify the CU-EUT effect on
trade flows between Turkey and non-EU members. Remarkably, due to import tariff re-
ductions Turkey’s adoption of the EU acquis and improved customs procedures, both
Turkish exports to and imports from third countries are positively affected, though less
strongly than European-Turkish trade flows. These results show that both the EU and
Turkey gained considerably from the CU-EUT. This illustrates that trade liberalization
beyond mere RTAs may be a worthwhile endeavour.
The strong trade-enhancing effect is confirmed in a more disaggregated bilateral and
sectoral consideration. While confirming the overall robustness, it also reveals substantial
heterogeneity. In order to understand the potentially underlying mechanisms driving these
differences, we related our 277 bilateral, directional, two-digit industry-level coefficients
and our 911 three-digit level coefficients to tariff changes, initial bilateral trade cost prox-
ies, the direction of trade and sectors. This second-stage analysis revealed that only tariff
changes do not contribute to explaining the observed differences, suggesting that the
CU-EUT effects are not driven by mere tariff cuts. The comparatively small trade effects
in some sectors (food, chemicals, minerals, and metals) indicate a potential for the addi-
tional liberalization of manufacturing trade in an upcoming renegotiation of the CU-EUT.
Furthermore, despite our finding of large average impacts on manufacturing trade, the
CU-EUT cannot be considered an exceedingly deep agreement in terms of the provisions
covered as it misses, among other things, liberalization in primary agriculture, services,
public procurement and investment. There is room for more far-reaching commitments
that may stimulate trade flows between the EU and Turkey even more.
While the application of recent advances in gravity estimation turned out to be crucial
in identifying the magnitude of the CU-EUT trade effect, the data required to implement
these advances limited our sample choice, specifically in terms of years, countries and
parts of the economy covered. With increasing data availability, it would be worthwhile
to consider more recent developments, as well as effects on non-manufacturing sectors.
Furthermore, taking international migration and foreign direct investment into account
might yield a more complete picture of the effects of the CU-EUT.
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